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While the study of war still seems to be approached largely from a strategic or military 
angle, the last twenty years have been marked by increasingly reliable and useful accounts 
of the aftermath of hostilities, with Toby Judt and Ian Kershaw providing exciting templates 
for this approach to European history and Hans van de Ven and now Barak Kushner bringing 
this line of sight to East Asia, both with a focus on the Chinese postwar.
In this absorbing study, Kushner has chosen to examine the political and diplomatic 
manoeuvring around the Chinese communist and nationalist trials of Japanese war 
criminals held between 1947 and 1949 and to compare them with the management and 
similar manoeuvring around the better-known trials managed by the U.S. and its allies in 
Japan and elsewhere from 1945 to 1949–1950.
Kushner brings to this assessment a keen awareness of the special difference of the 
Chinese postwar resumption of hostilities in the last quarter of what would become a 
twenty-year war between exhausted rivals in a failing state, an outcome that would realign 
transnational infl uences and rearrange the stage for the Cold War in East Asia, even as these 
extended hostilities brought China to the very edge of destruction.
In the competition for the high ground in the battle not only for China but for all of 
the Asia that Japan’s phenomenal agenda had aspired to control, every aspect of China’s war 
of resistance against the Japanese invader was contested, not only between the two Chinese 
factions and the Japanese defendants, very few of whom had been tried at the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) in Tokyo, but also between the Chinese 
factions and Japanese national interests beyond the courtroom.
These trials would have been diffi  cult to manage at any time. To hold them throughout 
an ongoing civil war was a logistical triumph on all sides. As Kushner shows, the shortage of 
Chinese troops meant that the surrender of Japan did not always mean the retreat or capture 
of Japanese troops. The end of the Fifteen Years War and the beginning of the postwar did 
not have clear cut-off  points. Rather, the period from August 1945 to October 1949 saw the 
culmination of historical processes long delayed by a mix of imperialisms and fi nely-tuned 
collaborations. In a little over four years the pent-up battle for China would see centuries of 
chaos and misrule erupt into an urgent, vicious return to all-out civil war. The war crimes 
trials were held in the midst of these hostilities, with the prisoners guarded by soldiers who 
could hardly be spared from the fi ghting fi eld.
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The Communist Party would emerge from this scrum in somewhat bewildered and 
exhausted possession. The conventional narrative has it that the Nationalists made a dash 
for the exits, via the banks, but Kushner’s account now adds the courts to this escape route 
and brings another layer to the reinterpretation of the nationalist role in these conflicts.
Three unforgiving years would pass before either side in the civil struggle could even 
begin to lay claim to the failed state and unhappy boltholes of October 1949. On the cusp of 
the seismic reordering of Asia, both the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists 
had to deal with the legacy of the Fifteen Years War with Japan, and not only fight for China 
but also compete for the title as “just war” and establish ownership of the China brand. Out 
of this chaos, with the world wondering which China was waving and which China was 
drowning, the future demanded that each safeguard their potential national integrity by 
demonstrating their superior adherence to international legal and diplomatic standards. The 
war crimes trials provided a forum for these competitions and for the display of competing 
demonstrations of justness.
In the Chinese postwar, following the defeat, messy retreat, and the mass capture and 
re-enlistment of Japanese forces, both the Communist and Nationalist factions and interests 
within China invested hard-earned political and military capital in managing these trials 
and in collecting the bona fides for a national integrity that was still far from assured. From 
Tokyo, SCAP effectively represented Japan in this three-cornered battle for the ethical 
leadership of East Asia, with a focus on trying the category “A” prisoners charged with 
planning and directing the war.
Managing a formidable mass of what he describes as “an entirely new body of data” 
in recently opened vernacular archives of East Asia (p. 20), Barak Kushner has provided 
a reliably synthesized account of the Communist and Nationalist Chinese effort to bring 
international legal accountability to bear on the “B” and “C” categories of “conventional” 
war criminals in a long series of trials whose scale and complexity far exceeded the caseload 
managed by the IMTFE.
As Kushner shows, Japan and the two Chinas had too much political capital invested in the 
war crimes trials for resolution to be possible or, the impression remains, even desirable. Beyond 
Sugamo, the Japanese seized on democracy with an avidity that helped cement the relationship 
with their new masters, but outside the courtroom the Tokyo Trials were framed in such a way 
as to allow ample public space for the debate about their legitimacy that continues to this day.
Before and after MacArthur had left to belittle his Japanese admirers in Congress, Japan 
leaped into the ring with Communist China and Taiwan, fighting a propagandized legal battle 
even as, in “mainland” China, as Kushner shows in his introduction, “the form and function of 
law virtually disappeared from Chinese consciousness” (p. 9) while in Taiwan open discussion 
of Japanese war crimes was stifled by martial laws that would not be lifted until 1987.
Men to Devils, Devils to Men is a considerable and valuable achievement in historical 
scholarship. It opens up a little-noticed area of contention in a way that not only provides a 
template for further work on the transnational complexities of the early Cold War in Asia 
but also returns our attention to the huge sacrifices made by both China factions between 
September 1931 and October 1949.
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